the powers affigned to it, from the encroachmentof the other parts. This fecurity is fometimes called the balance of the conftitution; and the political equilibrium, which this phrase denotes, confists in two contrivances,—a balance of power, and a balance of intereft. By a balance of power is meant, that there is no power poffeffed by one part of the legiflature, the abufe, or excess of which is not checked by fome antagonist power, refiding in another part. Thus the power of the two houses of parliament to frame laws is checked by the king's negative; that if laws fubverfive of regal government fhould obtain the confent of parliament, the reigning prince, by interpofing his prerogative, may fave the neceflary rights and authority of his ftation. On the other hand, the arbitrary application of this negative is checked by the privilege which parliament poffeffes, of refufing fupplies of money to the exigencies of the King's adminiftration. The conftitutional maxim, that the king can do no

wrong," is balanced by another maxim, not lefs conftitutional," that the illegal commands of the

king do not juftify those who affift, or concur, "in carrying them into execution ;" and by a fecond rule, fubfidiary to this, "that the acts of "the crown acquire not any legal force, until au"thenticated by the fubfcription of fome of its

great officers." The wifdom of this contrivance is worthy of obfervation. As the King could not be punished, without a civil war, the conftitution exempts his perfon from trial or account; but, lest this impunity fhould encourage a licentious exercise of dominion, various obftacles are oppofed to the private will of the fovereign, when directed to illegal objects. The pleasure of the crown must be announced with certain folemnities, and attefted by certain officers of ftate. In fome cafes, the royal order must be fignified by a fecretary of ftate; in others,

I

others, it must pass under the privy feal, and in many, under the great feal. And when the king's command is regularly published, no mischief can be achieved by it, without the miniftry and compliance of those to whom it is directed. Now all who either concur in an illegal order, by authenticating its publication with their feal or fubfcription, or who in any manner affift in carrying it into execution, fubject themselves to profecution and punishment, for the part they have taken; and are not permitted to plead or produce the command of the king, in justification of their obedience. * But farther; the power of the crown to direct the military force of the kingdom, is balanced by the annual neceffity of reforting to parliament for the maintenance and government of that force. The power of the king to declare war, is checked by the privilege of the house of commons, to grant or withhold the fupplies by which the war must be carried on. The king's choice of his minifters is controlled by the obligation he is under of appointing thofe men to offices in the ftate, who are found capable of managing the affairs of his government, with the two houfes of parliament. Which confideration impofes fuch a neceffity upon the crown, as hath in a great measure fubdued the influence of favouritifin; infomuch, that it is become no uncommon

Amongst the checks, which parliament holds over the adminiftration of public affairs, I forbear to mention the practice of addreffing the King, to know by whofe advice he refolved upon a particular measure, and of punishing the authors of that advice, for the counsel they had given. Not because I think this method either unconstitutional or improper, but for this reason, that it does not fo much fubject the king to the control of parliament, as it fuppofes him to be already in fubjection. For if the king were fo far out of the reach of the refentment of the house of commons, as to be able, with fafety, to refufe the information requested, or to take upon himself the refponfibility inquired after, there must be an end of all proceedings founded in this mode of application.

spectacle

spectacle in this country, to fee men promoted by the king to the higheft offices, and richest preferments, which he has in his power to bestow, who have been distinguished by their oppofition to his perfonal inclinations.

By the balance of intereft, which accompanies and gives efficacy to the balance of power, is meant this, that the refpective interefts of the three eftates of the empire are so disposed and adjusted, that whichever of the three fhall attempt any encroachment, the other two will unite in refifting it. If the king should endeavour to extend his authority, by contracting the power and privileges of the commons, the house of lords would fee their own dignity endangered by every advance which the crown made to independency upon the refolutions of parliament. The admiffion of arbitrary power is no lefs formidable to the grandeur of the ariftocracy, than it is fatal to the liberty of the republic; that is, it would reduce the nobility from the hereditary fhare they poffefs in the national councils, in which their real greatness confifts, to the being made a part of the empty pageantry of a defpotic court. On the other hand, if the house of commons fhould intrench upon the diftinct province, or ufurp the established prerogative of the crown, the house of lords would receive an inftant alarm from every new ftretch of popular.power. In every conteft in which the king may be engaged with the reprefentative body, in defence of his established fhare of authority, he will find a fure ally in the collective power of the nobility. An attachment to the monarchy, from which they derive their own diftinction; the allurements of a court; in the habits and with the fentiments of which they have been brought up; their hatred of equality, and of all levelling pretenfions, which may ultimately affect the privileges, or even the existence of their order; in fhort, every principle and every prejudice

prejudice which are wont to actuate human conduct, will determine their choice, to the fide and support of the crown. Laftly, if the nobles themfelves fhould attempt to revive the fuperiorities, which their ancestors exercised under the feudal conftitution, the king and the people would alike remember, how the one had been infulted, and the other enflaved, by that barbarous tyranny. They would forget the natural oppofition of their views and inclinations, when they faw themselves threatened with the return of a domination, which was odious and intolerable to both.

The reader will have obferved, that in defcribing the British conftitution little notice has been taken of the houfe of lords. The proper ufe and defign of this part of the conftitution, are the following: Firft, to enable the king, by his right of beftowing the peerage, to reward the fervants of the public, in a manner moft grateful to them, and at a small expence to the nation; fecondly, to fortify the power and to fecure the stability of regal government, by an order of men naturally allied to its interefts; and, thirdly, to answer a purpose, which though of fuperior importance to the other two, does not occur fo readily to our obfervation; namely, to stem the progrefs of popular fury. Large bodies of men are fubject to fudden phrenzies. Opinions are fometimes circulated amongft a multitude without proof or examination, acquiring confidence and reputation merely by being repeated from one to another; and paffions founded upon

thefe

thefe opinions, diffufing themselves with a rapidity which can neither be accounted for nor refifted, may agitate a country with the moft violent commotions. Now the only way to ftop the fermentation, is to divide the mafs; that is, to erect different orders in the community, with feparate prejudices and interefts. And this may occafionally become the use of an hereditary nobility, invefted with a fhare of legiflation. Áverfe to those prejudices which actuate the minds of the vulgar; accustomed to condemn the clamour of the populace; difdaining to receive laws and opinions from their inferiors in ank, they will oppofe refolutions, which are founded in the folly and violence of the lower part of the community. Was the voice of the people always dictated by reflection; did every man, or even one man in an hundred think for himself, or actually confider the measure he was about to approve or cenfure; or even were the common people tolerably stedfaft in the judgment which they formed, I fhould hold the interference of a fuperior order, not only fuperfluous, but wrong: for, when every thing is allowed to difference of rank and education, which the actual ftate of thefe advantages deferves, that, after all, is most likely to be right and expedient, which appears to be so to the separate judgment and decifion of a great majority of the nation; at leaft, that, in general, is right for them, which is agreeable to their fixed opinions and defires. But when we observe what is urged as the public opinion, to be, in truth, the opinion only, or perhaps the feigned profeffions of a few crafty leaders; that the numbers who join in the cry, ferve only to fwell and multiply the found, without any acceffion of judgment, or exercise of understanding, and that oftentimes the wifeft counfels have been thus overborne by tumult and uproar,-we may conceive occafions to arife, in which the commonwealth may

be