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e our

40603 came in the CAD E T, duetive of the many good consequences our Author modestly enumerates. <But how.can this be done in detachments? fince by the Roster fome tegiments may give an Officer, and some not, fome may tend more men, and others fewer.

5.8 16mun We agree with our Author in his sentiments (chap. ix.) of the advantages that would redound from each regiment's having fo many field - pieces to attend it to be managed by the regimental officers and foldiers. Toward the end of the last war, each battalionzi by the Duke's orders, had artillery, and some of the battalion-men were infructed in the management of the great guns.

75 Hora 31. In chapter x. are some good hints with regard to the institution of a regimental Gunsmith; and to lighter accoutrements * and in chapters xi, and xü, the duties of a Corporal and Serjeant are pretty fully described. For these Author has been mnoftly obliged to M. Bombelle's Service, de ? Infanterie. The ninth chapter begins with an accurate defcription of the academy founded by the Empress-Queen at Neustadt,under the fuperintendence of Counts Daun and Theirheim. We should be forry to see such a school established in Britain: that Athenian was wise, who reproved the joy his countrymen expressed, for the finishing a fort at the pyreum, by telling them, that what they, then were so glad of, would, in the end, be turned to their destruction. The remainder of this chapter is very important, and ought to be read by, at least, all young Officers; for much we fear, that the defcription given by the late Marshal Saxe, of the manner in which the French Officers pass their time in country, quar. ter3, is but too applicable to our own,+ with the addition of drunkenness: a vice to which the French Officers are no ways addicted,

It is a very false and dangerous notion that the profession of arms, has nothing to do with books. The foldier has much time on his hands, and if he does not read, it is either wasted away in idle (auntering, or disipated in debauchery. Study, therefore, ought, in a particular manner, to be recommended to our military Gentlemen. Books have sometimes formed, and always have improved, the General. One

who peruses the great actions of a Xenophon, or a Cæsar, and ??? catches the spirit of those illustrious writers, can hardly ever provę

a daftard, One that reads the stratagems of a Polyænus and

In time of war, our soldiers carry each near 90 pounds weight ! which, furely, is too much for a march of any length.


aflign their

Frontinus, will

learn to form in his mind, all possible contingencies

, and will never be at a loss forexpedients. Our Author is aware of this; and, from Santa Cruz, and Buonamici, recommends the Muses to the soldierad They, indeed, humanize ferocity, and make that tob flow from principle which was formerly brute impulse. We are sorry, however, to find, that our Author thinks the knowlege of the Greek tongue unnecessary to an Officer. b Had he been as well acquainted with that language, as he is with the French, he would have talked in another strain : it was the language of *free-born Heroes, and, therefore, should seem better suited to the genius of a British Officer.

2 1691051 10 But to proceed, there are fome good things in his chapters entitled, Of Captains, of Majors, of Lieutenant-Colonels,

of Colonels, of General Officers. We wonder he did not 1

. Courage, (chap. 20, 21.) cannot be read with too much atIs tention: and if his instructions for Officers commanding detachments on a march, (chap. 22.) had been punctually prac

tised on a late occafion, Britain had saved much expence of 21

blood, and her foldiers had not fled before an inferior, and favage enemy. s gaismast af Toyboltouki

) styUNDO? 70

Nor are his precautions with regard to Convoys, Ambus-cades, Qut-Guards, Garrison-Towns, and the method of

Fortifying a Church, Village, &c. less important. These are រៀន

marked with inverted Commas: (his own observations, too, 1900

are distinguished in that manner) but our Author honestly Istowns, that he is indebted for what he has delivered on these 20. fubjects, to Santa Cruz, and the Ingenieur de Campagnes ; YAW The last chapter, on Caftrametation, is chiefly ex

tracted from Le Blond's Arithmetique, and Geometrie de l' not

Oficier; and concludes with the Meafurement of a Camp for asd 290110

a Battalion, as practised in 1755, by Lord Rothes, in Ireland :

where this book was first published. nad ei mot un 719105

Upon the whole, it appears to us, that tho’ this gentleman -97 ad

is a modest, he is not the less an intelligent, writer;---and that Ono

there is no doubt but his work will be found useful to every brist rank of military men. Mis

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For OCTOBER, 1756.

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bus I. N Appeal to the Sense of the People, on the present

Posture of Affairs. Wherein the Nature of the late Treaties are enquired into, and the Conduct of the Mary, with regard to M-ns-ca; Szc. is confidered; with fome Remarks upon the Light in which these, and other public Affairs, have been lately represented. 8vo. I's. Hookham. Jual As the free discuffion of public affairs is the privilege, we had

like to have said the prerogative of every free nation, so there - never was a period; perhaps, vihen it was exercifed in a more smple manner, than at present in England. After a deep sleep, and dead filence, for a considerable interval, the groans of the

preis are beard from every quarter, and the pamphlet-fhops filled * with the products of its labours : every measure, and every mir

carriage is publicly arraigned, by persons pleading, or pretending to plead, the Cause of their Country; and what must contribute

greatly to the discovery and establishment of Truth, the friends and followers of the Administration, condefcend, at length, to reply... Of this we had one proof in our last, and the piece now

us which only well infructed, but well qualified to make the most of his caule ; his file being

easy and natural, his manner, for the g neral, temperate ; his method well adapted to his purpose; his expedients ingenious and acute, and his subject matter of lo confolatory a nature, that one cannot help' wishing every word he writes to be true,

one cannot help What he undertakes, is to shew the whole scheme of our operations, fo far as a private man may comprehend it; and that, bfrom the whole fo laid together, all the objections which have s been raited to the detached parts, (and which could not have been

raised, were they nat induftrioufly separated, thewn out of their natural order, and confounded with other things, wholly foreign tp them) will vanith of themselves.

He then gives his own conception of the first part of qur ! fcheme, in the following terms:

To bind down the arms of France on the Continent, by a I chain of judicious alliances.

Secondly, To cut off the resources of our enemy, by, destroying their trade and seizing their feamen.

sic Thirdly, To secure ourselves from an invasion, by a powerful .! squadron in our own ports; and, at the fame time, to block up

the French navy in their ports, to prevent more effectually their designs either on Ireland or America.

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Fourthly, To send søch a force into America as might conclusively turn the ballance in that part of the world in our faThese, I conceive, were the grounds upon

which our Admi• niftration intended to form the whole fabric of their designs ;

and if, as I appose, very little can rationally be objected to the, the superstructure will appear well built and of the whole taken together, will make one entire well imagined

piece.' ' s Descending then to particulars, he further thews the grounds and realons of our late treaties, and that they were not more the result of neceflity than of wisdom and policy, justifies the cap-s

of the French trade, as a blow, directed at the heart of the French affairs; and, having put the loss accruing to the enemy thereby, into the scale againit Minorca, pronounces, that the former out-weighs the latter. He also justifies the care taken, and Preference Thewn to the defence of Britain and Ireland againk Lan invasion, to the relief of Minorca, je and argues, that of four choices which might have been made with regard to the laft of thofe seryices, we took the best; namely, 'to let Minorca confide in the known strength of St. Philip's Fort, and the expe

Tienced courage and fidelity of the Commander, until a fleet 2h could be got ready which, without destroying the other parts 07 of the plan, might baffle that of the French, defeat their Heet, Wo and relieve the place. What he says, further on, concerning

the miscarriage of Mr. Byng's expedition, the present inflamed i ftate of that controversy, requires to be given in his own words : which are as follow,

If we knew, as a simple view of the plan might have made us know, that Fort St. Philip's was a place hardly

fecond to any in Europe for ftrength, and fortified by every advantage of Na15 the country of Minorca, which laid the besiegers under innu

merable difficulties if we were convinced of the honour and

capacity of the Governor, what error: was committed in not ihtipping our own coast, to send Mr. Byng's fleet before the 7 middle of March, for lo foon was he appointed to the Command, when the French fleet did not fail till the rath of April, que did not land before the 18th, nor opened the trenches, to be

afterwards carried on with infinite difficulty, before the asth? • It is agreed upon all hands, that Mo Byng, notwithstanding s his delay here till the 9th of April, might have reached Minor

ca on the 5th of May with great eales now what scheme was ever yet accused of delay, which was calculated to relieve a place of the most immense strength attacked under so many Hive even

fourteen days after this times and thát this was foreseen, which no human prudence could foresee, who could blame a relief as delayed, which subjected a place of such firft



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rioy rate frength, and at beft of fecondary confideration, to a fiege

the most valuable objects of the warp But in reality the place veggpheld out thirty dayo longer than this furtheft unforeseen period

no earlier than this period, is it a very extraordinary presump

tion to reckon upon such a place's holding out only half the gaol time it was actually maintained? And longer the feet

, even under this Commander, could not have been delayed: But that bottom

the fleet performed no effectual service that the place was not bom relieved, and that the Admiral did not a& conformably to his no country's expectations, is but too true! But what had this to

bambus vusat do with the original Design ? certainly nothing.

But why, fay they, should this man at all been employed ? 1912

Let me in my turn afk, why he should not have been employ. canon ed? Who of all those Gentlemen who are now grown fo wise - more

by the event of things, then objected to him? Why should On

not he have been employed, who was bred from his infancy to maritime affairs, had a skill undisputed, a courage unquestion

ed, and an honour untainted, till that fatal day who had his do own reputation, the example of an heroic father, and the ho

of a noble family, before his eyes to excite him to his du2003

in a command which he himself had follicited : Had his follicitation been rejected ; had this command been given to an other, and had he unhappily failed, as this man has, the tide of declamation had run more violently the other way and these promising circumstances, which seemed to mark him out for playing a noble part on a theatre, where his father had acted fo gloriously, had been founded every where to the difgrace of a Ministry which had the blindness to neglect such an apparent designation. But objections of the weakest kind are

admitted against expeditions which want fuccess; such is that - nowe of Mr. Byng's not having had a suficient force: But it must

icimo never be allowed, that we ought not to reckon on Mr. Edgeer 1* combe's fquadron as next to certains for we must always reck

bbon that an Officer will do his duty, as Mr. Edgcombe did bis ; -M . and that, therefore, he would, in all probability, quit Mahon -3911 as early as possible, to join the squadron he must have expect

ed, and did expect, to fail to its relief : But if ten of the - O ablest, best appointed thips, that ever failed out of Britain, Tardes with this reinforcement, are not able to engage

ce with assurance LB 30 of success, twelve French, foul, and but indifferently equipped, zbas I do not know what men can depend upon." Vianor Having also, in his way, affured us, that by adhering feadily Dirk to the plan, the enemy will be fo wasted by degrees, that we may

look forward with Confidence, to make France yield up Minorca,

with the rest of her encroachments ; he proceeds to thew, that sit the same consistency of measures has been observed with relation 15 p1 to our American concerns, tho' as injurioufly, and violently com2013 plained of, as to those relating to Mahon; and he promulges the


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