could never be the effect of blind chance. The old and new teftament confirm each other: the prophetic parts of the former support the gospel, and the miracles and prophecies and success of Chrift and his apostles support the old teftament. 2. Chrift knew the hearts of men, as he shewed upon all occafions; a knowledge which almighty God represents in scripture as so peculiar to himself, that he cannot be supposed to fuffer those to partake of it who are not sent by him. 3. He was a prophet: he foretold not only things remote and lying beyond human fagacity, but things improbable and miraculous, which have been accomplished. 6 4. Hewrought miracles numerous and various, worthy of himself, and beneficial to men: and many of these miracles were also prophecies at the same time, and indications of future events: and so were most of his parables. 6 5. He never erred or failed in any point, as teacher, prophet, meffias, or worker of miracles. All his promises were accomplished, particularly his remarkable promise that he would fupport and comfort all those who should be called to fuffer and to die for his fake, which hath been illuftrioufly fulfilled in ancient and in modern martyrs. 6. He conferred miraculous and prophetic gifts on his disciples, and they on theirs. 7. His religion was pure and popular, yet plain and holy, and tending to make men wiser and better; and it produced a multitude of good effects in the world. 8. When it was first preached, it could never have made its way without the assistance of miracles. 6 9. He lived and died an example of all that he taught, of all active and suffering virtues. 10. He had no rival or antagonist, to make his authority appear doubtful, by oppofing prophecies to his prophecies, and miracles to his miracles, from the time that he began his ministry to this day.------ It cannot be supposed that there should be any deceit in this complicated evidence, and that falfhood should boast of all the imaginble characters of truth.' He now proceeds to fay fomewhat concerning the postapoftolical miracles; and observes, concerning them, that, as they fall short in many instances of the diftinguishing characters belonging to the works of Christ and his apoftles, so they must fail of giving us the fame full perfuafion and fatisfaction. He further observes, that they were not foreVOL. VI. Ff told told by the prophets; that they were not wrought by prophets; that they contained in them no prophetic indicatiors of future events; and that no man ever laid down his life, or even fuffered distress and perfecution in attestation of them. The christian miracles, says he, may be referred to four periods. The first period contains those which are recorded in the new testament, and reaches to about A. D. 70. Of these there can be no doubt among christians. The next period may be of thirty-feven years, and ends about A. D. 107. There is reason to think it probable that some miracles were then performed. by those who preached and planted the gospel in Pagan countries. The third reaches from thence to Constantine. For fome of the miracles in these ages, in the second and third centuries, so much may be alledged as should refstrain us from determining too positively against them, and denying them all. The last period is from Constantine to where you please, and abounds with miracles; the defence of which shall be left to those who are inclined to undertake it, at the hazard of misapplying their pains. One fort of miracles seems to have been much wanted, and that was, to caft the romantic devil out of the christians of those times; but this kind goeth not out so easily, and stands in awe of no exorcifms. Some few miracles indeed are said to have been wrought in the days of Constantine, and in remote regions where the gospel was then first propagated, which, though for certain reasons one cannot rely upon them, yet may require a suspense of judgment.--- If it be ask'd, when miraculous powers ceased in the church? The proper answer seems to be, that these miracles cease to us, when we cease to find. fatisfactory evidence for them. Some of the post-apoftolical miracles shall be confidered in the course of this work; and what may be fairly urged in their favour, shall not be omitted: but it may not be amiss to declare once for all, that I would not engage for the truth of any of them, after A. D. 107; and that I defire to be ranked, as to this point, not amongst the denyers and rejectors, but amongst the doul ters.. In the remaining part of this work the reader will find many judicious remarks on the apologists for chriftianity and their writings; a large account of the Manichean heresy; the characters of Tertullian, Adrian, Cyprian, Justin Martyr, Origen, &c. but we shall finish our account of it with acquainting acquainting our readers, that mr. Jortin has carried his remarks down to the age of Constantine, and that he intends to confider the completion of the prophecies, in the establishment of chriftianity, and in the deftruction of the persecuting princes, in another volume. ART. XLIX. Principles of polity : being the grounds and reasons of civil empire. In three parts. By Thomas Pownal, efq; 4to. 4s. Served. E. Owen. THE ingenious and judicious author of this piece hav ing, in a former small performance, (fee our Review for February 1750) pointed out the defects and inconfiftencies attending the doctrine of an original contratt, proceeds now to shew, that the grounds and reasons of civil empire arife from nature, and not from positive institution. He makes it appear, that the focial state is the real state of man's nature; that the BALANCE OF PROPERTY can be the only first, natural, real and permanent ground of those connexions and fubordinations which form an empire; that this balance is indeed to be rectified and regulated by the hands of the legislature or minister, but that it has its foundation in nature, in the SCITE and circumstances of the country and people; and that all governments that have been able to subsist and maintain themselves have been formed upon it. Our author applies his principles to the real exercise and administring of government, and shews, that they are confiftent throughout with that true policy which is founded in liberty. It appears from the whole of his performance, that he is a thorough master of his subject, and well acquainted both with ancient and modern history: his stile indeed is, in fome places, fomewhat intricate and perplexed; but his reasonings, as far as we are able to judge, are folid and convincing, and his reflections just. As he has thought proper to treat his subject in the way of dialogue, our readers cannot expect that we should give large extracts from his work; we must therefore leave them to judge of his manner of writing by the following specimen, which will likewise enable them to form some idea of his manner of reasoning. • I suppose we shall be agreed, says he, let us found government on what principles foever, that it is that actuating power by which a people is directed in its actions upon thofe Ff2 those objects which it stands related to as a community; that is, in regard to its interest as a community. Now, this interest of the community we have found to be the whole communion of all the powers and capacities of the several individual constituents, conspiring by a consociation of fuch powers into one organized whole. Which, as it hath to itself a distinct principle of individuality, hath likewife an interest of this individuality, distinct from that of the particular constituents, confidered as separate and independent: and which, as it subsists by a kind of organization from the confpiring powers of the united constituents, would be destroyed by any felfish, partial, or unequal direction of those powers in the individual. That is, those reflections under which this common interest exists, and by which it subsists, are different from, and inconfiftent with those, by which the interest of the individual exists, respecting only its partial individuality. Now, asthe whole of those relations of things under which any being exists, is called its nature; so that power in man, which perceives those relations, is called reason. And, as you fee there are relations confiftent and inconfiftent with the true nature, so there is a right reason and a wrong. And, as those actions which regard the true whole of the nature of that being they are exerted upon, are the actions of right reason; fo those which regard only fome partial felfish portion, unequal to, and inconsistent with the whole, and difproportionate to the true nature of that whole, however in regard to that portion, they are at that time right) may be called affection, and, in contradiction to reason, will. As in man that uniform tenor of the reasoning power, that at all times extends to the whole of his nature, is called right reason; fo those partial and unequal fallies of it, which by fits and starts, confineits view to any felfish portion of this nature, are called affection and will. Hence the common intereft, as above described, could neither be formed or adminiftred by will, because will, by the very nature of it, is unequal to itself, unequal and disproportionate to the whole of the nature of this interest, and many times, as 'shall happen, absolutely inconsistent with it. The right interest of the whole community, as above described, can never be limitted to the reason of any partial actuating power of fuch community; because the reason of such, however right it may be, in respect of its partial individuality, is, in regard to the reason which should guide the whole, what will or affection is, in regard to man's right reafon. The The reason then of that actuating power only, whose in terest extends to, and circumscribes the interest of th whole, can be the right reason of the whole. Where then the balance of property or this interest is, there will be the right reason of the whole; and, where this interest is, there will be the power; not an absolute irrefistible power, but a power to controul the will of the whole; because, by its connexion with this interest, itsubsists by it, and because, tho' will may not in every particular instance fee this its right interest, yet the reasoning part has such influence, by means of all the inciting objects, that can affect will, being in its hands, that it does in every instance lead it. Having therefore thewn, that the power, reason, and will of the whole community are naturally connected, and connected under the interest of the whole, and reside where is found the balance of the property in the community; which balance is determined by the scites and circumstances of a country and its people: we will venture to say in the words of mr. Harrington, that all government is interest, and the predominant (interest) gives the matter or foundation of government.' ART. L. De Homine. Poema Alexandri Popii quatuor epistolis confcriptum, a Johanne Sayer, A. M. Latine redditum. Oxonii, &c. 4to. 2s. 6d. Rivington, &c. THE public is here presented with the third epiftle of See him from nature rifing flow to art ! 'N! EN POPE. ut naturâ quàm lentè exfurgit ad artem! Tunc RATIO urgebat preffo veftigia greflu INSTINCTUS; ità tunc homini NATURA locuta eft-Vade! Docende feris, elementa exquirito passim : Ex avibus quos, disce, cibos dumeta miniftrant; Ex pecubus difcas agri medicamina scitus; Disce tuas apibus condendi callidus artes; Findere talpa folum doceat, contexere vermis; NAUTILUS exiguus monftret dare lintea, remos Ff3 Pandere |