upon them at prefent, but refer them to another opportunity.

SERMON LXXXIX.

Honesty the best preservative against dangerous mistakes in religion.

JOHN vii. 17.

If any man will do his will, he fhall know of the doEtrine, whether it be of God, or whether I Speak of myself.

The third fermon on this text.

Hen I made my entrance into these words, I propofed from this text,

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Firft, To fhew that an honest and fincere mind, and a hearty defire and endeavour to do the will of God, is the greateft fecurity and beft prefervative against dangerous errors and mistakes in matters of religion.

In the next place, I proceeded to remove an ob jection, to which my difcourfe upon this fubject might feem liable. Some perhaps might ask, Is every good man then fecure from all error and miftake in matters of religion? This is a mighty privilege indeed. But do we not find the contrary in experience, that an honeft heart and a weak head do often meet together? For answer to this I laid down feveral propofitions ;

By the last of which I fhewed, that God hath made abundant provifion for our fecurity from fatal and dangerous errors in religion, both by the infallible rule of the holy fcripture, and by fufficient means of inftruction to help us to understand this rule, and by his infallible promife of affifting us, if with honeft minds, and a due diligence, we apply ourfelves to the understanding of this rule, and the

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ufe of thefe means. And this, I told you, was in all refpects a better fecurity, and more likely to conduct us fafe to heaven, than any infallible church whatsoever; and that for five reafons; four of which I have already treated of, and now proceed to the fifth and last, viz.

Because this provifion which I have fhewn God hath made, is both as good a fecurity against fatal errors and mistakes in religion, as an infallible church could give, if there were one: And it is likewife as good a way to prevent and put an end to controverfies in religion, fo far as it is neceffary they fhould be prevented, or have an end put to them. And thefe are the two great reafons why an infallible judge is fo importunately demanded and infifted upon. I fhall fpeak to these two points distinctly and severally.

First, Because this is as good a fecurity against fatal errors and mistakes in religion, as an infallible church could give, if there were one. For an infallible church, if there were fuch an one upon earth, could not infallibly fecure particular Chriftians against errors in faith, any other way, than by the definition and declaration of thofe who are infallible in that church. And there are but three that pretend to it either the Pope, or a general council, or the Pope and a general council agreeing in the fame definitions. Not the Pope by himself, nor the general council without the Pope; because the church which pretends to infallibility is not agreed, that either of thefe alone is infallible, and therefore their definitions can be no certain, much lefs infallible foundation of faith; no, not to that church which pretends to infallibility. So that if there be an infallible oracle in that church, it must be the Pope and council in conjunction, or the definition of a council confirmed by the Pope. Now in that cafe, either the council was infallible in its definitions, before they had the Pope's confirmation, or not. If the council was infallible in its definitions, before they had the Pope's confirmation; then the council alone and of itfelt was infallible, (which a great part of

the

the church of Rome deny) and then it needed not the Pope's confirmation to make it infallible: Or elfe a general council is not infallible in its definitions, before they receive the Pope's confirmation; and then the Pope's confirmation cannot make it fo: For that which was not infallibly defined by the council, cannot be made infallible by the Pope's confirmation.

But there is another difficulty yet: It is a maxim generally received, and that even in the Roman church, That the definitions of a general council, "confirmed by the Pope, are not obligatory, un"lefs they be received by the univerfal church." From whence these two great inconveniencies will unavoidably follow.

I. That no man is obliged to believe fuch defini tions, till he certainly know that they are received by the univerfal church, which how he fhould certainly, much lefs infallibly know, I cannot underftand; unless he either fpeak with all the Chriftians in the world, or the reprefentatives of all particular churches return back and meet again in council, to declare, that the univerfal church hath received their definitions; which I think was never yet done.

. II. It will follow, that the definitions of a general council confirmed by the Pope, are not infallible, till they be received by the univerfal church. For if they were infallible without that, they would be obligatory without it; because an infallible definition, if we know it to be fo, lays an obligation to believe it, whether it be received by the univerfal church, or not. And if fuch definitions are not infallible till they be received by the univerfal church, they cannot become infallible afterwards; because if the definitions were not infallible before, they cannot be received as fuch by the universal church, nor by the mere reception of them, be made to be infallible definitions, if they were not to before.

But if we fhould pafs over all thefe difficulties, there is a greater yet behind, and that is, fuppofing the definitions of general councils confirmed by the Pope to be infallible, particular Chriftians cannot be

fecured infallibly from error without the knowledge of thofe definitions. And there are but two ways imaginable of conveying this knowledge to them: either by the living voice of their particular paftors, whom they are implicitely to believe in thefe matters; but particular paftors are fallible (as they themfelves grant) and therefore their words can neither be an infallible foundation of faith, or an infallible means of conveying it; and it is unreasonable, they fay, for men that own themselves to be fallible, to require an implicite belief to be given to them: or elfe the knowledge of the definitions of councils must be conveyed to particular Chriftians by writing, and if fo, then there will only be an infallible rule, but no living infallible judge. And if an infallible rule will ferve the turn, we have the fcriptures which we are fure are infallible, and therefore at least as good as any other rule. But they fay, that the definitions of councils give us an infallible interpretation of fcripture, and therefore are of greater advantage to us. But do not the definitions of councils fometimes alfo need explication, that we may know the certain fenfe of them, without which we cannot know the doctrines defined? Yes certainly, they need explication as much as fcripture, if there be any dif ference about the meaning of them; and there have been, and ftill are, great differences among those of their own church about the meaning of them. And if the explications of general councils need themfelves to be explained, then there is nothing got by them, and we are but where we were before: For differences about the meaning of the definitions of general councils, make as great difficulties and uncertainties in faith, as the differences about the meaning of fcripture.

Well, but the people have the living voice of their particular paftors to explain the definitions of councils to them. But this does not help the matter neither, for these two reasons:

1. Because particular paftors have no authority to explain the definitions of general councils. The council of Trent hath, by exprefs decree, referved

to

to the Pope, and to him only, the power to explain the definitions of the council, if any difference arife about the meaning of them. So that if there be any difference about the true fenfe and meaning of any of the definitions of the council, particular paftors have no authority to explain them; and where there is no doubt or difference about the meaning of them, there is no occafion for the explication of them.

2. But fuppofe they had authority to explain them, this can be no infallible fecurity to the people, that they explain them right; both becaufe particular paftors are fallible, and likewife because we fee in experience that they differ in their explications; witnefs the Bishop of Condom's expofition of the catholick faith, and of the definitions of the council of Trent, which is in many material points very different from that of Bellarmine, and many other famous doctors of that church. And which is more, witness the many differences betwixt Ambrofius, Catharinus, and Dominicus à Soto, about the definitions of that council, in which they were both prefent, and heard the debates, and themfelves bore a great part in them. Now, if they who were prefent at the framing of the definitions of that council cannot agree about the meaning of them, much lefs can it be expected from those that were abfent.

Secondly, This provifion which I have mentioned, is likewife as good a way to prevent and put an end to controverfies in religion, fo far as it is neceffary they should be prevented, or have an end put to them, as any infallible church would be, if there were one. And this is another reafon why an infallible church is fo much infifted upon, that there may be fome way and means for a final decifion of controversies, which the fcriptures cannot be, because they are only a dead rule, which can end no controverfy without a living judge ready at hand, to interpret and apply that rule upon emergent occafions.

It is not neceffary that all controverfies in religion fhould either be prevented, or decided: This the church which pretends to be infallible cannot pretend to have done, because there are manifold controver

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