difplaying his flag upon a defert coaft. Now nothing can be more fanciful, or less fubftantiated by any confiderations of reafon or juftice, than the right which fuch discovery, or the tranfient occupation and idle ceremony that accompany it, confer upon the country of the discoverer. Nor can any ftipulation be produced, by which the reft of the world have bound themselves to fubmit to this pretenfion. Yet when we reflect that the claims to newly difcovered countries can hardly be fettled, between the different nations which frequent them, without fome pofitive rule or other; that fuch claims, if left unfettled, would prove fources of ruinous and fatal contentions; that the rule already propofed, however arbitrary, poffeffes one principal quality of a rule-determination and certainty, above all, that it is acquiefced in, and that no one has power to fubftitute another, however he might contrive a better in its place: when we reflect upon thefe properties of the rule, or rather upon thefe confequences of rejecting its authority, we are led to afcribe to it the virtue and obligation of a precept of natural juftice, because we perceive in it, that which is the foundation of juftice itself, public importance and utility. And a prince who fhould difpute this rule, for the want of regularity in its formation, or of intelligible juftice in its principle, and by fuch difputes fhould disturb the tranquility of nations, and at the fame time lay the foundation of future difturbances, would be little lefs criminal, than he who breaks the public peace by a violation of engagements to which he had himself confented, or by an attack upon thofe national rights, which are founded immediately in the law of nature, and in the first perceptions of equity. The fame thing may be repeated of the rules which the law of nations prefcribes in the other inftances that were mentioned, namely, that the obfcurity of their origin, or the arbitrarinefs of their principle, fubftracts nothing

nothing from the refpect that is due to them, when once established.

WAR may be considered with a view to its caufes and to its conduct.

The juftifying causes of war are deliberate invasions of right, and the neceffity of maintaining fuch a balance of power amongst neighbouring nations, as that no fingle state, or confederacy of states, be ftrong enough to overwhelm the reft. The objects of just war are precaution, defence, or reparation. In a larger sense, every just war is a defenfive war, inafmuch as every juft war fuppofes an injury perpetrated, attempted, or feared.

The infufficient causes, or unjustifiable motives of war, are the family alliances, the perfonal friendhips, or the perfonal quarrels of princes; the internal disputes which are carried on in other nations; the justice of other wars; the extenfion of territory, or of trade; the misfortunes or accidental weakness of a neighbouring or rival nation.

There are two leffons of rational and fober policy, which, if it were poffible to inculcate into the councils of princes, would exclude many of the motives of war, and allay that reftlefs ambition which is conftantly stirring up one part of mankind against another. The first of these leffons admonishes princes to "place their glory and their emulation, "not in extent of territory, but in raifing the "greatest quantity of happiness out of a given ter"ritory." The enlargement of territory by conqueft is not only not a juft object of war, but in the greater part of the inftances in which it is attempted, not even desirable. It is certainly not defirable where it adds nothing to the numbers, the enjoyments, or the fecurity of the conquerors. What commonly

commonly is gained to a nation, by the annexing of new dependencies, or the fubjugation of other countries to its dominion, but a wider frontier to defend, more interfering claims to vindicate; more quarrels, more enemies, more rebellions to encoun, ter; a greater force to keep up by fea and land; more services to provide for, and more establishments to pay? And, in order to draw from these acquifitions fomething that may make up for the charge of keeping them, a revenue is to be extorted, or a monopoly to be enforced and watched, at an expence which cofts half their produce. Thus the provinces are oppreffed, in order to pay for being ill governed; and the original ftate is exhausted in maintaining a feeble authority over difcontented fubjects No affignable portion of country is benefited by the change: and if the fovereign appear to himself to be enriched or ftrengthened, when every part of his dominion is made poorer and weaker than it was, it is probable that he is deceived by appearances. Or were it true that the grandeur of the prince is magnified by thofe exploits; the glory which is purchased, and the ambition which is gratified by the diftress of one country, without adding to the happiness of another, which at the fame time enflaves the new, and impoverishes the ancient part of the empire, by whatever names it may be known or flattered, ought to be an object of univerfal execration; and oftentimes not more so to the vanquished, than to the very people whofe armies or whofe treasures have atchiev ed the victory.

There are, indeed, two cafes in which the extenfion of territory may be of real advantage, and to both parties. The firft is, where an empire thereby reaches to the natural boundaries which divide it from the rest of the world. Thus we account the British channel the natural boundary which feparates the nations of England and France: and if France poffeffed any counties on this, or England any cities

or

or provinces on that fide of the fea, the recovery of fuch towns and diftricts, to what may be called their natural fovereign, though it might not be a just reafon for commencing war, would be a proper use to make of victory. The other cafe is, where neighbouring states, being feverally too fmall and weak to defend themselves against the dangers that furround them, can only be fafe by a strict and conftant junction of their strength: here conqueft will effect the purposes of confederation and alliance: and the union which it produces is often more clofe and permanent, than that which refults from voluntary affociation. Thus, if the heptarchy had continued in England, the different kingdoms of it might have separately fallen a prey to foreign invasion; and although the interest and danger of one part of the island was in truth common to every other part, it might have been difficult to have cir culated this perfuafion amongst independent nations; or to have united them in any regular or fteady oppofition to their continental enemies, had not the valour and fortune of an enterprifing prince incorporated the whole into a fingle monarchy. Here the conquered gained as much by the revolution as the conquerors. In like manner, and for the fame reason, when the two royal families of Spain were met together in one race of princes, and the feveral provinces of France had devolved into the poffeffion of a fingle fovereign, it became unfafe for the inhabitants of Great Britain any longer to remain under separate governments. The union of England and Scotland, which transformed two quarrelfome neighbours into one powerful empire, and which was first brought about by the course of fucceffion, and afterwards completed by amicable convention, would have been a fortunate conclufion of hoftilities, had it been effected by the operations of war. These two cafes being admitted, namely, the obtaining of natural boundaries and barriers, and the including under the fame government, those

who

who have a common danger, and a common enemy to guard againft; I know not whether a third can be thought of, in which the extenfion of empire by conqueft is useful even to the conquerors.

The fecond rule of prudence which ought to be recommended to those who conduct the affairs of nations is," never to pursue national honour as dif "tinct from national intereft." This rule acknowledges that it is often neceffary to affert the honour of a nation for the fake of its intereft. The fpirit and courage of a people are fupported by flattering their pride. Conceffions which betray too much of fear or weakness, though they relate to points of mere ceremony, invite demands and attacks of more ferious importance. Our rule allows all this, and only directs that, when points of honour become fubjects of contention between fovereigns, or are likely to be made the occafions of war, they be estimated with a reference to utility, and not by themfelves." The dignity of his crown, the honour of "his flag, the glory of his arms," in the mouth of a prince, are ftately and impofing terms; but the ideas they inspire are infatiable. It may be always glorious to conquer, whatever be the juftice of the war, or the price of the victory. The dignity of a fovereign may not permit him to recede from claims of homage and respect, at whatever expence of national peace and happiness they are to be maintained, however unjust they may have been in their original, or, in their continuance, however ufclefs to the poffeffor, or mortifying and vexatious to other states. The purfuit of honour, when fet loose from the admonitions of prudence, becomes in kings a wild and romantic paflion; eager to engage, and gathering fury in its progrefs, it is checked by no difficulties, repelled by no dangers: it forgets or defpifes those confiderations of safety, eafe, wealth, and plenty, which, in the eye of true public wisdom, compofe the objects, to which the M m

renown